Abstract
This paper analyses the sequence of 25, 26 and 27 April 2026 in Mali, marked by coordinated attacks attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) against Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, Mopti and Kidal. It argues that these three days should be read less as an isolated tactical episode than as a systemic test of Mali’s military state. The confirmed death of Defence Minister Sadio Camara, the now public tactical coordination between JNIM and the FLA, Kidal’s de facto loss alongside Africa Corps’ withdrawal, the absence of a consolidated casualty toll, and the competition among statements issued by the government, the FAMa, armed groups, the Coalition des Forces pour la République (CFR), and regional and international actors all reveal a crisis that is simultaneously territorial, politico-military and narrative. Drawing on work on legal authoritarianism, authoritarian drift, the state’s moral inversion, adaptation mechanisms, videomania, social media and the digitalization of Mali’s public sphere, the paper shows how official language seeks to convert retreat into repositioning, opacity into strategic prudence, and vulnerability into proof of sovereignty. The sequence thus opens a new phase: not only has the security apparatus been hit, but the credibility of the promise of state restoration has once again been exposed to the test of facts.
Keywords: Mali; coordinated attacks; Kidal; JNIM; FLA; security; authoritarian governance
JEL Codes: D74; H56; L82; O55; P16
